Abstract
Inflation targeting is
a monetary policy regime. It involves the public announcement of medium-term
numerical targets for inflation with an institutional commitment by the
monetary authority to achieve these targets. Adoption of inflation targeting is
not just a policy declaration. For that certain pre-requisites must be
fulfilled. Focusing monetary policy on inflation does not imply that inflation
targeting is indifferent to the performance of the real economy is simply
incorrect. In Nepalese context, to switch monetary policy towards inflation
targeting, central bank should have to fulfill pre-requisite first. Basically
autonomy of central bank, public communication are the most important
pre-requisite that Nepal must have to fulfill. Top of all the existing exchange
rate system with Indian currency must be addressed so that economy can move
towards inflation targeting.
Key words: Inflation
Targeting, Monetary Policy Framework.
1.
Introduction
Inflation
targeting is a monetary policy regime has been used in monetary arena after
1990s. According to International Monetary
Fund(IMF) inflation targeting involves the public announcement of
medium-term numerical targets for inflation with an institutional commitment by
the monetary authority to achieve these targets. Additional key features
include increased communication with the public and the markets about the plans
and objectives of monetary policymakers and increased accountability of the
central bank for attaining its inflation objectives. Monetary policy decisions
are guided by the deviation of forecasts of future inflation from the announced
target, with the inflation forecast acting (implicitly or explicitly) as the
intermediate target of monetary policy (Acharya, 2012).
Policymakers used to anchor their monetary policy by
targeting a monetary aggregate, with expectation that controlling the demand for
and supply of money, would enable them to bring down the rate of inflation.
Unfortunately, monetary aggregate targeting proved unsuccessful because of instability
in the money demand function. As a result to bring down the rate of inflation
and to maintain it at a low level central bank adopted a policy with flexible
exchange rate, is finally termed as Inflation Targeting Framework (ITF)
(Freedman and Laxton, 2009).
The first country to formally adopt inflation targeting
was New Zealand in December 1989. Since then,
many countries have joined the club including both industrialized countries
(such as Australia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) and emerging
economies (such as Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Czech Republic, Iceland, Israel,
Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, and South Africa), with the US being the most recent addition to the list in
January 2012. Many other countries are in the process of establishing a full
inflation-targeting regime; while others, like European Central Bank (ECB) remain
implicit targeters. Only three countries, Finland, Spain and Slovakia, have
abandoned inflation targeting and this was due to their adoption of the euro
which, as governed by the ECB (www.centralbanking.com). There are four Asian
countries namely South Korea, Thailand, Philippine and Indonesia, has endorsed
IT as a new monetary policy regime. (Ito and Hayashi, 2004).
The objective of this paper is to review the current
situation of inflation targeting and its prospects in Nepal. This paper is
organized as follows. After the brief literature review in section two, third section
provides a glimpse of prospect analysis in Nepal. and final section concludes
the work.
2. Literature Review
2.1 Pre-requisite of Inflation Targeting
Inflation targeting is a monetary-policy strategy
that is characterized by an announced numerical inflation target, an
implementation of monetary policy that gives a major role to an inflation
forecast. It has been called forecast targeting, and a high degree of
transparency and accountability. It means adoption of inflation targeting is
not just a policy declaration. For that certain pre-requisites must be
fulfilled. Major pre-requisites suggested in literature are discussed as below.
2.1.1
Sole Target
One of the most important pre-requisite for
adopting the inflation targeting is the absence of another targeted nominal
variable such as wages, level of employment or nominal exchange rate. Having
more than one target may destroy the credibility of both anchors and there
might be conflicts among the objectives. Before declaring inflation targeting
target must be define very lucidly whether it is point or band. If bans then
what should be the width of that band. Moreover time horizon and choice of the
price index must be maintained very properly (Tutar, 2002).
2.1.2
Autonomy of Central Bank
Debelle et.al (1998)
argued for independency of central. The
independence does not mean the full independence but implies at least
instrumental independence which permits greater discretion in the conduct of
monetary policy and which mainly implies that the central bank cannot finance
the government budget. In the same manner, the central bank should not be
required to attain low interest rates on public debt or to maintain a
particular nominal exchange rate. There should not be any political pressure on
the central bank to raise the rate of economic growth in such a way that is
inconsistent with the achievement of the inflation target.
2.1.3 Effectiveness of
Monetary Policy
Having autonomy of central bank does not
mean that there is effectiveness of monetary policy. Effectiveness indicates to
establish stable relationship between the inflation outcomes and monetary
policy instruments. According to Jonsson (1999) in inflation targeting regime,
monetary authorities have to be able to model inflation dynamics in the country
and to forecast the inflation to a reasonable degree. So, the monetary
authorities should have access to policy instruments that are effective in
influencing the macroeconomic variables.
2.1.4
Accountability and Transparency of Central Banks
A notable feature is found
in New Zealand, whereby the governor who must report on inflation performance
twice each year, may be dismissed prior to the end of his five year term if the inflation rate falls outside its
specified target band (McCallum, 1996). This shows the accountability of the
respective authority which is most important factors for inflation targeting
countries. Aliyu and Englama (2009) also demand to be informed about the
process and progress made by central bank.
The increased accountability of the
inflation targeting enables the monetary authority to monitor and enhance the
understanding of expectations. It also decreases the possibility of time
inconsistency trap, which leads to deviations from monetary authority's
long-term objective. Moreover, it provides a good benchmark that can easily be
observed by the agents in the economy (Hazirolan, 1999).
By means of transparency, private sector
agents can monitor and question the authorities. advice, analysis, and actions.
So, this forces the authorities to get their analysis right. Since private
sector agents can easily observe any myopic policy strategy under a transparent
monetary policy framework, there are severe constraints to surprising the
public (Hazirolan, 1999).
2.1.5
Development of Financial Institutions
Aliyu and Englama (2009) categorized
the inflation targeters on the basis of development of financial institutions.
Proper functioning of financial institutions leads to degree of succession of inflation
targeting because instruments used by central banks transmitted through the
financial institutions. Thus, sound bank and financial institutions as well as
effective management of monetary and capital market is prominently expected to
have on the respective economy.
2.1.6
Flexible Exchange rate System
Debelle et.al (1998) and
Mishkin (2000) strongly argues flexible exchange rate as a one of the most
important pre-requisite for inflation targeting. If exchange rate system is fixed
then it is impossible to any government to maintain both exchange rate as well
as inflation under control. Thus, to attain desirable rate of inflation, exchange
rate must be flexible.
2.1.7
Effective Communication
Effective communication increases
transparency of the monetary policy strategy through communication with the
public and the markets about the plans, objectives, and decisions of the
monetary authorities (Miskin, 2000). This is possible if central bank makes public announcement about the
policy of targeting so that to attain the targeted band or point.
2.1.8 Macroeconomics Indicators
Aliyu and Englama (2009)
expect to have stable employment situation, satisfactory growth on GDP,
desirable BOP and proper regulation over public expenditure. Autonomy of
central bank and proper coordination between monetary fiscal and financial
policy leads towards the desirable macroeconomic situations.
2.2
Types of Inflation Targeting
Aliyu and Englama (2009) have identified three category of inflation targeting they are;
2.2.1. Full Fledge Inflation Targeting
(FFIT)
When a country is ready to adopt IT as its single
nominal anchor upon which macroeconomic stability would be achieved. Full
Fledge IT (FFIT) is suitable in a country with a sound financial environment and
transparency, accountability and highly committed central bank. These elements
are desirable to the attainment of the goals of Full Fledge IT.
2.2.2 Electic Inflation Targeting(EIT)
When a country pursues IT along with other monetary
policy objective in a stable financial environment Electic IT is suitable.
However, in such a condition central bank is relatively less accountable and
transparent.
2.2.3 Inflation Targeting Lite (ITL)
ITL category is suitable to those countries, which
have a low profile due to lack of strong or credible macroeconomic environment.
ITL adopting countries usually float their exchange rate and announce an IT.
But they usually do not attain the stated inflation target.
One of the important thing about the inflation
targeting is that it is not just a framework, which only focuses on maintaining
inflation within targeted band. It concerns about the fluctuation on output and
employment. Focusing monetary policy on inflation, according to them, does not
imply that traditional stabilization goals are ignored. The monetary policy
makers under inflation targeting are indifferent to the performance of the real
economy is simply incorrect. Central banks, which are responsible for inflation
targeting, continue to be concerned with fluctuations in output and employment
in all the countries they have studied. They have found that the output and
employment continue to remain concerns of policy makers after switching to
inflation targeting. In fact it can be seen in all the inflation targeting countries
have invariably undertaken disinflation only gradually (Bernanke et. al. , 2011).
3.
Contextualization
Nepal Rastra Bank's Strategic Plan (2006-2010) has disclosed
about inflation targeting in its Functional Strategies. Neither second
strategic plan (2012-2016) has reported progress about inflation targeting nor
any research has been archived in Nepalese context. One empirical study has
been conducted by Acharya (2012) using ARDL to cointegration to evaluate
feasibility of inflation targeting in Nepal.
Central bank of Nepal has enacted Nepal Rastra Bank
Act -2058 and has been continuously formulating monetary policy annually. By
laws, central bank is considered as an autonomy institution but significant
dominance has been made by fiscal policy. Due to this reason effective
implementation of monetary policy always in limbo. It impact adversely on all
fiscal, monetary as well as financial institutions.
Regarding the relation between real GDP on price level
theoretically it is assumed that there is negative relationship between real
GDP and Price Level. But in fiscal year (FY) 2010/11, when food production (it
includes paddy, maize, millet, buckwheat, wheat and barley.) has increased by
10.87% and reached to 8606742 metric tons. Due to an increase in food
production it was expected by using the general rule of economics a decline in
price of those goods. At the same fiscal year the price of food and food
products has increased by 13.4% (Economic Survey 2011/12). It means rise in
production does not show negative relation with the price level in Nepal which
contradict the theory (Acharya, 2012).
Empirical result
suggested by NRB(2007), Ginting (2007) and Acharya (2012) found that wholesale
price index of India has positive impact on Nepalese price level. This result
shows that Nepalese economy import inflation from India. It may be due to high
trade concentration with India, pegged with Indian currency and open boarder
between these two countries.
Nepal
has been facing the sharp appreciation of the US dollar in this two years. It
is not because of export fluctuation but due currency fixed with Indian
currency. Nepal has not faced any direct impact, so far, from the global
financial crisis too. This is because, its financial market is not open to
short-term portfolio investments from abroad. Exports will fall faster as competitiveness
of Nepalese products is going lower as other countries producing similar goods
face the downturn for their export to the industrial nations (Pokheral, 2009).
This is one of the most restrictive situation in Nepal to switch towards
inflation targeting.
4.
Conclusion
To
switch monetary policy framework towards inflation targeting, central bank
should have to fulfill pre-requisite first. Basically autonomy of central bank in
real sense and build up transparency as well as good public communication are
the most important pre-requisite that Nepal must have to fulfill. Moreover,
government should have to solve the structural problems and need to address on
the problem of market imperfection to upgrade its macroeconomic indicators. Top
of all the existing exchange rate system with Indian currency must be addressed
so that economy can move towards inflation targeting.
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